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Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) instills trust in certificates commonly used to secure email, web 
traffic, VPNs, file transfers, and other forms of network communication.   Due to a number of 
successful attacks against certificate authorities, malicious parties have illegitimately acquired 
trusted certificates for widely used online services, government agencies, and other important 
organizations.  These incidents, and the potential for future attacks of a similar nature, present 
notable risk to PKI and global security as a whole. 
 
The proposed Certificate Policy Framework (CPF) offers a mechanism for organizations to 
control which certificates are authorized to authenticate their services.  This DNS-based protocol 
allows organizations to publish an access control list for any given hostname, where each entry in 
the ACL identifies a certificate and indicates whether the certificate should be blocked, warned 
upon, or permitted.  Similarly, any CPF-compatible application can query DNS for CPF records 
to verify the integrity of the certificate from an authoritative viewpoint.  In this work, we review 
limitations in PKI and certificate-based security and review existing work in this area.  We will 
also discuss CPF in greater detail and demonstrate how it can be used to augment PKI to 
strengthen this widely adopted technology. 
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We continue to enjoy the benefits of modern networks, which provide a medium for the fast and 
reliable exchange of information.  In conditions where security is desired or essential, we rely 
upon encryption to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of data while in transit.  In many cases, 
public key cryptography is used to establish a secure connection over unsecured networks.  This 
crypto-system utilizes two unique, mathematically related keys – a private key and a public key.  
The public key is often bound with identification information to form a certificate for 
authentication.  However, in order to use a certificate in this manner, we need to trust that the 
identity information is accurate – that is, that the peer is who it claims to be.  Without establishing 
trust, data could be unintentionally shared with an unauthorized party impersonating the intended 
peer. 
 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has been widely implemented as a foundation for instilling trust 
in certificates [19].  PKI is a centralized trust model comprised of one or more certificate 
authorities (CAs) run by trusted organizations, third parties, and governments.  Operating systems 
and third party applications support a number of CA certificates by default, thereby trusting them 
and any certificates that they sign (endorse).   Reputable certificate authorities abide by a set of 
policies for verifying the information associated with a certificate prior to signing it; in some 
cases these checks are initiated by a registration authority (RA) before being passed to the CA for 
signing.  These verification checks are in place to ensure that certificates will only be issued to 
authorized requestors, providing credibility to the system. 
 
While PKI has proven to be a scalable and manageable trust model, security professionals have 
expressed concern over weaknesses [16][13].  In the past, highly regarded CAs have issued 
certificates representing specific services to individuals having no affiliation with the domain 
owners [9].  In addition to the risks associated with validation failures, computing resources 
maintained by certificate authorities have also been compromised in the past.  As a result of these 
breaches, attackers were able to fraudulently acquire trusted certificates for numerous services.  
These certificates could be used to intercept traffic destined for the target services via a man-in-




These issues demonstrate a major problem with PKI – certificate authorities are trusted 
unconditionally [10].  The organizations whose online services have been negatively impacted by 
breaches at CAs had no way of preventing the certificates from being generated or trusted.  Each 
client application dictates which CAs are considered trustworthy, and will inherently accept any 
certificate issued by a trusted CA.  Due to this broad level of trust, the issuance of an illegitimate 
certificate will allow a malicious party to falsely impersonate a service or organization without 
warning. 
 
In addition to the flaws with PKI, there are issues with certificate-based security.  Application 
warnings caused by certificate validity errors are often simple for users to bypass, providing little 
protection.  Also, if a service is compromised and the public/private key pair is exposed, the 
attacker could launch a transparent MITM attack.  These situations further challenge the ability 
for PKI and certificates to properly secure traffic. 
 
In order for PKI to be a viable trust model in the future, organizations must have the ability to 
manage which certificates are authorized to identify its services.  Additionally, client applications 
must be able to access this information and enforce it.  We believe that this can be accomplished 
using a protocol designed to distribute certificate authorization rules and policy.  This work 
presents a new protocol called certificate policy framework (CPF), which allows organizations to 
advertise authorized certificate signatures for a given hostname via the domain name service 
(DNS).  In addition, it will allow organizations to provide client applications with guidance on 
whether to permit, warn, or block connections based on the certificate that it receives.  The 
enhancements introduced by CPF will complement the trust offered by certificate authorities, 




Public key cryptography is commonly applied to networked services in order to conceal data 
being exchanged between peers and to prevent the modification of data while in transit.  This is 
commonly achieved using X.509 certificates, a standard format for combining identity 
information with a unique public key.  Certificates are an integral part of encryption protocols 
like Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Socket Layer (SSL), and are 
heavily leveraged to tunnel unencrypted protocols like SMTP (email), FTP (file transfers), and 
HTTP (web browsing).  Internet users most commonly interact with certificates while web 
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browsing, as nearly everyone visits websites and web applications protected by HTTPS.  
Common examples include online banking sites, stock/401k portfolio management sites, and 
webmail services.  Without TLS/SSL protecting these plaintext protocols, it would be trivial to 
eavesdrop on the traffic.  Given the right access, it would also be possible to intercept the traffic 
in transit and manipulate it transparently. 
 
Eavesdropping can occur using passive monitoring as data passes through a network.  Network 
taps, port mirroring, and wireless sniffing are common ways to capture data transparently as it 
traverses network devices and transmission media.  Packet capture tools like Wireshark or 
TCPDump can be used to save and analyze pure network traffic streams, while more security-
driven tools like Cain & Able1 can be configured to sniff traffic and capture specific information 
like account credentials.  When encryption protocols are applied and comply with best practices, 
the application data is concealed from exposure as cipher-text and cannot be accessed without 
possessing the appropriate encryption key(s). 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of third party eavesdropping on encrypted communications. 
 
A MITM attack is an active effort by a malicious party to intercept network connections by 
posing as the intended peer on both sides.  In order to successfully orchestrate a MITM attack, the 
network traffic must flow through a system controlled by the attacker.  This can be done at OSI 
layer 2 via an ARP poisoning attack, by receiving routed traffic, or by poisoning DNS to direct 
traffic to a different IP address.  By maintaining separate connections to the client application and 
server and acting as a pass-through, the attacker gains the ability to both eavesdrop on 
communications and manipulate the data in-transit.  Encrypted protocols such as TLS/SSL and 
                                                 
1 http://www.oxid.it/cain.html 
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SSH are also susceptible to MITM attacks, although it’s extremely difficult to intercept this 
traffic undetected. 
 
SSH uses a host key by default, which is the public key.  The first time an SSH client like Putty2 
connects to an SSH server, it stores the server’s host key locally as a reference for future 
connections.  If the client ever connects to the same resource and is presented with a different 
host key, it will suspect a MITM attack and notify the end-user.  This validation technique 
employs “trust on first use” (TOFU) where the client assumes that the first time they connect to 
an endpoint it is legitimate [12].  If the connection is being intercepted on first use, then the client 
will remain unaware that the encrypted connection has indeed been compromised. 
 
TLS-based connections are not generally susceptible to the risks associated with TOFU due to the 
use of signed certificates and support for PKI.  A TLS-enabled service authenticates itself to the 
client application using an X.509 certificate that has been signed by a highly accepted certificate 
authority, such as Symantec (VeriSign), Thawte, or Entrust.  Client applications often trust these 
and other CAs by default, and will implicitly trust any certificate that a trusted CA has signed.  
Thus, the client is able to use its pre-shared trust relationship with the CAs to verify that the 
certificate representing the remote service is truly legitimate. 
 
 
 Figure 2: Example of a successful MITM attack on encrypted communications. 
 
If the TLS connection is being proxied in a MITM attack, it’s likely that the attacker is using a 
self-signed certificate or invalid certificate, which would not be trusted by default.  This should 
cause the client application to present an error to the user or refuse the connection. 
 
                                                 
2 http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/ 
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Certificates and PKI, paired together, effectively address the limitations of simple public key 
exchanges and provide strong security.  However, there are other challenges with certificate-
based security and PKI trust that introduce risk and are cause for concern. 
 
Certificate Trust Errors are Ignored 
 
One of the key purposes of PKI is to prevent a MITM attack from occurring transparently.  
Certain applications, such as the Oracle Java Runtime Environment will fail when connecting to 
an untrusted peer by default.  Other applications will warn the user and require confirmation to 
proceed.  Although client applications may vary in their response to an untrusted certificate, they 
should universally prevent a connection from occurring in a completely trusted context under 
conditions that indicate otherwise.   
 
Web browsers are among the most common applications that prompt the user to continue if a 
certificate’s trust cannot be determined.  Traditionally, browsers will generate warnings when 
presented with a peer certificate that has not been signed by a trusted CA, has been revoked, has 
expired and is no longer considered valid, or where the certificate common name does not match 
the hostname provided in the URL.  While the majority of certificates presented to users are valid 
and trusted, there are situations where untrusted certificates are used to protect services and 
applications on intranets, development networks, and Internet-facing devices for the sole benefit 
of encrypting traffic.  In these cases, the end-user must decide whether or not to trust the 
connection.  Certificate trust is a complicated matter, and studies indicate that a high percentage 
of users don’t fully understand certificate warnings or the risks associated with trusting a 
questionable certificate [18].  When a user decides to trust an unknown certificate and continue 
with the connection, they may be unintentionally passing their data to a malicious endpoint. 
 
Certificate Validation Vulnerabilities 
 
As mentioned previously, public key certificates are the combination of a public encryption key 
and fields containing identification information.  Fields of interest often include (but are not 
limited to) the “subject name”, “validity period”, “issuer name”, “basic constraints”, and “key 
usage” [7].  In order for a certificate to act as an authenticator, applications must be able to 
interpret this information and enforce security accordingly.  However, there have been logic flaws 
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in various applications that prevented them from properly applying certificate security, putting 
their users at risk.   
 
In 2009, a null prefix attack was publicly disclosed and impacted a number of applications, such 
as popular web browsers, instant messaging applications, and email clients [11].  Due to a 
validation bug when interpreting the subject name of a certificate, the inclusion of a “\0” 
character would cause the application to treat this string as the end of the field content.  For 
instance, if a person owned the domain “example.com” and purchased a certificate for 
“www.rit.edu\0.example.com”, a CA would legitimately issue an X.509 certificate as a 
subdomain for “example.com”, but vulnerable applications would interpret the common name as 
www.rit.edu. 
 
In 2011, a similar vulnerability was disclosed affecting various devices produced by Apple Inc. 
[8][14].  Apple’s data security component did not properly validate the “basic constraints” field 
of all certificates in the certificate chain.  Due to this bug, a certificate specifically designated for 
server authentication could be used to sign another certificate just like a CA.  When working 
properly, software should check to ensure that the certificate used to sign another is a CA – if it is 
not, then the certificate should not be trusted. 
 
These types of application vulnerabilities provide attackers with an opportunity to circumvent 
certificate security and intercept encrypted traffic in a completely trusted context.  While code 
flaws are unavoidable in applications, a defense-in-depth approach can significantly reduce the 
impact of these deficiencies.  Rather than relying solely on certificate validation, it would be 
beneficial to have another mechanism in place to verify the legitimacy of the certificate.  
 
PKI Reliability Issues 
 
Certificate authorities and registration authorities are the catalysts for trust in PKI.  They are the 
bodies that are responsible for investigating the legitimacy of certificates and endorsing them.  By 
having a pre-shared trust relationship with specific CAs, the integrity of any given server 
certificate can be verified easily by client applications.  While CAs are an essential component for 
trust in the digital world, vulnerabilities have been discovered that introduce major security 
implications when successfully exploited. 
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In the past, we have observed successful attacks against CAs by way of weaknesses in domain 
validation processes.  On December 29th, 2008 a registration authority associated with the 
Comodo CA mistakenly issued a certificate for mozilla.com to an unauthorized researcher [9].  
Comodo confirmed that this issue resulted from a failure in processes and had taken steps to 
remediate the issue.   However, this particular incident is important because the technical controls 
proved to be ineffective, as opposed to being maliciously circumvented. 
 
More recently, we have witnessed sophisticated attacks against CAs by way of bypassing controls 
to fraudulently acquire certificates for important services and organizations.   In March of 2011 
an attacker was able to acquire valid certificates for popular online services managed by seven 
different companies including Google, Microsoft, the Mozilla Foundation, and Skype via a 
registration authority associated with Comodo Group.  The fraudulent certificates were quickly 
detected and revoked by Comodo, and browser vendors deployed application updates to blacklist 
the malicious certificates.  The login credentials for the registration authority had been 
compromised, granting attackers access to generate certificates [22]. 
 
In July of 2011, StartCom’s StartSSL CA suffered a similar security attack that led them to take 
their online services offline for a short period of time.  StartCom confirmed that no fraudulent 
certificates were issued as a result of the attack and their CA private keys were not exposed.  [4]  
While no specific details were posted about the attack, it raises concerns as attackers continue to 
target PKI vendors.  
 
In September of 2011, Dutch certificate vendor DigiNotar B.V. disclosed a major security breach 
affecting its systems.  As a result, attackers were able to generate 344 fraudulent certificates 
successfully targeting domains for a variety of services.  Impacted organizations included Google, 
Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, Yahoo, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and 
other major certificate authorities.  An independent investigation indicates that the attackers had 
full administrative control over numerous certificate servers operated by DigiNotar, and were 
believed to be active for well over two months [15]. Computer forensics uncovered several 
malicious applications resident on DigiNotar’s servers, developed specifically for use on their 
systems.  Several weaknesses were also discovered in DigiNotar’s “secure” computing 
environment; the domain administrator password was identified as weak, facilitating compromise 
on a larger scale.  In addition, no antivirus or anti-malware solutions were installed, applications 
were not patched, and critical services were not separated in accordance with best practices. 
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These incidents raise major concerns regarding the security provided by certificate authorities.  
As of July 2010, there are 1,482 certificate authorities run by 651 organizations worldwide that 
are trusted by popular web browsers [3].  While this provides a wide degree of competition and 
flexibility when choosing a PKI vendor, client applications are placing full trust in an 
extraordinary number of organizations.  Most certificate authorities are independently managed 
and differ in policies and security posture.  In the case of the DigiNotar breach, the company’s 
PKI infrastructure lacked the most basic and essential security controls.   With hundreds of 
organizations running trusted certificate authorities, we must consider the possibility that other 
PKI environments may not adhere to industry security standards and best practices. 
 
With an increasing trend of attacks against certificate authorities, they may be exposed to greater 
risk than in the past.  PKI services are of great interest to parties that would benefit by being able 
to intercept secure communications and possess the means to do so, such as state-sponsored 
attackers.  By gaining access to generate trusted certificates on-demand, attackers also gain the 
ability to intercept secure communications on a wider scale undetected.  In addition, the 
previously discussed weaknesses in existing PKI services indicate that this infrastructure may be 
more vulnerable than originally perceived.  Due to the design of the PKI trust model, if any given 
CA issues a fraudulent certificate then it will impact all applications that trust the CA without 
confinement.  In other words – the compromise of a certificate authority yields a high reward to 
the attacker, and nearly the same results can be achieved regardless of which CA is targeted.  
Essentially, PKI is only as strong as the weakest certificate authority or registration authority.  




A malicious attacker can overcome the protection provided by PKI and certificate-based security 
using a variety of methods that range in impact and scope, as shown in table 1.  The most 
damaging attacks allow traffic to be intercepted in a trusted context, such that the end-user or 
system is not aware of the compromised connection and continues to exchange data that may be 





Threat Impacted Audience Scope Context 
Certificate Errors Ignored by User/App Specific peers (users) Limited Untrusted 
Certificate Validation Vulnerabilities in Apps Specific applications Limited Trusted 
Improper Certificate Issuance by CA Specific service Limited Trusted 
Compromised CA Multiple services Broad Trusted 
Table 1:  Summary of threats that negatively impact the security provided by PKI. 
 
All of these issues pose a threat to users, organizations, and systems.  Fortunately this area 
continues to attract more attention by the academic and security communities, and previous work 




As previously discussed, one of the challenges with public key certificates is that trust warnings 
are not easily understood by users.  The work of Sunshine et al [18] found that a significant 
percentage of users do not understand the risks associated with SSL certificate warnings in 
browsers, and often opt to ignore the potential danger.  This behavior was most common with 
warnings that are cryptic and easily disregarded (Firefox 2.x) or capable of being bypassed with 
little effort (IE7).  The Firefox 3 web browser introduced an SSL warning that requires multiple 
steps to bypass, further improving user behavior.  Although the design of the certificate warning 
impacts its effectiveness, the authors of this study ultimately concluded “the best avenue we have 
for keeping users safe may be to avoid SSL warnings altogether and really make decisions for the 
users – blocking them from unsafe situations and remaining silent in safe situations”.  We agree 
with this assertion – it would be ideal to prevent users from accessing services protected by 
certificates or public keys that pose a significant risk.   
 
In order for applications to proactively protect users, they need to support alternative mechanisms 
beyond PKI for assessing the risk associated with a certificate.    Two works have examined the 
concept of verifying the legitimacy of public keys by comparing them to other vantage points on 
the Internet.  Stone-Gross et all propose the VeriKey solution [17] to detect MITM attacks against 
websites that use self-signed certificates.  Wendlandt, Anderson, and Perrig propose a very 
similar solution, Perspectives [20], to address the “trust on first use” issue with public keys to 
prevent MITM attacks.  These solutions work on the fundamental premise that all client devices 
should be presented with the same public key when connecting to a service, regardless of 
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geographic location or Internet Service Provider (ISP).  If a particular client receives a public key 
certificate that differs from everywhere else, there is an elevated risk that the traffic is being 
intercepted.  When connecting to a remote service that supports public key cryptography, the 
client application queries a set of geographically distributed “verification servers” for their view 
of the service’s public key.  Upon receiving the hostname, a verification server connects to the 
target service, receives the public certificate, and returns it to the requesting client for 
comparison.  If the public key presented to the verification server matches the public key seen by 
the application, then the key is legitimate.  However, if they do not match, then it’s likely that the 
traffic is being intercepted. 
 
 




Figure 4: Verification process under MITM attack conditions using an external public key comparison service. 
 
The concepts presented by Perspectives have been adopted and enhanced in Convergence3, a new 
project that’s available to the general public.  While the goal of previous solutions was to improve 
authenticity for self-signed certificates and public keys, Convergence has been developed with an 
expanded purpose – to replace certificate authorities as the trust point for services using public 
key cryptography [12].  If successful, the replacement of PKI would lead to the elimination of CA 
trust for server certificate authentication.  Companies and organizations could simply apply a self-
signed certificate to their services in order to enable encryption, and Convergence would provide 
verification that a client’s connection is truly secure.   This notion has appeal and highly visible 
upside, but introduces several concerns. 
 
PKI has existed for decades and is integrated into many different operating environments as a 
security standard.  In addition to global PKI, companies and organizations may run an internal 
certificate authority as a method of authenticating local services.  In order to eliminate PKI, many 
network applications will need to be updated.  Web browsers and SSH clients come to mind 
immediately, and we would expect these to have the greatest impact.  However, many other 
applications would also need to adopt Convergence - SMTP servers, FTP clients, VPN software, 
and a variety of third-party applications. 




In certain cases, network visibility will be a hurdle for Convergence.  It’s straightforward for 
notary servers to verify the public keys on Internet-facing services so long as they are publicly 
accessible.  However, if a device is not available to the Internet, then the notary servers will not 
be able to verify the public key.  An alternative may be for companies to run an internal notary 
server, which presents its own issues.  A dedicated notary server is another service to maintain, 
which can be inconvenient for smaller organizations which are limited in funding and technical 
resources.  In addition, notary servers using the preferred Perspectives backend require network 
connectivity to any devices running secure services in order to verify the public key.  This may 
pose a dilemma for organizations enforcing strict network access controls, since the notary server 
could be viewed as a central point to circumvent firewall restrictions. 
 
It is also noteworthy that Convergence focuses its verification process on public keys, which are 
the unique id and true identifier.  However, X.509 certificates also include field information that’s 
currently validated by certificate authorities (albeit the degree of review varies between CAs and 
their certificate products).  It is useful for certificates to include information like the “organization 
name”, providing it is accurate.  By ignoring these fields, it greatly reduces the ability for X.509 
certificates to act as a true certificate of identity. 
 
Rather than replacing certificate authorities, other efforts have explored opportunities to 
strengthen PKI.  Hallam-Baker, Stradling, and Laurie propose allocating a Certificate Authority 
Authorization (CAA) resource record in DNS; this would allow domain owners to publish the 
object identifier (OID) of approved certificate authorities for their domains [5].  In turn, whenever 
a CA receives a certificate signing request, a CAA record check would be required as part of its 
verification procedures.  If the record exists but the CA’s OID is not listed, then the request 
should be rejected due to insufficient authorization.  In effect, this will allow organizations to 
indirectly control which CAs can sign certificates for its services.  It also imposes a new layer of 
accountability on CAs; if a certificate is signed illegitimately even though a CAA record is 
present, then this would indicate bigger issues with the offending CA’s security controls and may 
warrant global revocation of trust. 
 
A relatively new IETF working group, DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE), 
has also begun working on approaches to provide greater trust in networked communications [2].  
The purpose of this group is to provide DNS administrators with the ability to bind identification 
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information with specific services securely using DNSSEC, for the purposes of distribution and 
authentication.  They are currently overseeing the development of a protocol for linking 
certificates and certificate associations with domain names for use in TLS connections [6].  The 
initial specifications allow certificates, public keys, and CAs to be linked to a service via DNS for 
trust.  The details of this protocol are still under development, but show promise and are bound to 
be a significant contributor in this area.  Conceptually, it shares similarities with the CPF 
protocol, although it is more geared towards the publication of trust points rather than distributing 
detailed policies.  As a result, the protocol can dictate what is considered trusted but cannot offer 
any greater granularity or guidance to a client application. 
  
Overview of CPF 
 
The recent attacks against certificate authorities are a clear indication that we cannot continue to 
rely upon these entities as the sole proprietors of online trust.  Furthermore, application-specific 
X.509 certificate validation vulnerabilities, certificate warning ineffectiveness, and similar issues 
have contributed to the reduced effectiveness of certificate-based security.   Foreseeing this as an 
opportunity to develop a more comprehensive solution, Certificate Policy Framework (CPF) is 
intended to address a number of these limitations.   
 
The CPF protocol defines a lightweight means of publishing, retrieving, and interpreting 
certificate policies for a network service.  CPF policy is comprised of a set of authorization rules 
for certificates and public keys.  Each policy entry defines a certificate based on its hash digest 
and indicates how client applications should react if matched.  The policies are published in DNS 
as text-based resource records, and are specific to each fully-qualified hostname as it appears in 
DNS and in either the certificate common name or subject alternative name. 
 
CPF empowers organizations with the ability to control the authorization of certificates 
representing its services.  This approach establishes dual-control shared between the CAs and 
authoritative organizations, effectively limiting trust in CAs.  The use of PKI and CPF together 
promote greater security than either can provide independently.  CAs will still be responsible for 
verifying the legitimacy of a certificate signing request and then signing the certificate, thereby 
providing a level of assurance from a third party.  CPF offers a certificate verification mechanism 
from the perspective of the authoritative entity, which is inherently the most knowledgeable party 




The foundation of CPF is derived from Sender Policy Framework (SPF), a widely implemented 
DNS-based protocol that allows domain owners to publish a list of mail servers that may send 
email on behalf of a given domain [21].  The use cases for SPF and CPF are very similar; a given 
Peer2 receives information from Peer1, but Peer2 is not confident that Peer1 is trustworthy.  In 
turn, Peer2 contacts the DNS server controlled by the organization responsible for the alleged 
Peer1 to verify legitimacy and authorization (if available).  In the case of SPF, an SMTP server is 
interested in verifying that the client server’s IP address is authorized to forward mail on behalf of 
the sender’s domain.  Similarly, a CPF-compatible client application is interested in verifying the 
legitimacy of a peer’s public key before exchanging data. 
 
The full specifications for the CPF protocol have been documented as an RFC-style draft 
included in the appendix of this work.  The RFC discusses the CPF protocol and how it should be 
applied and interpreted in great detail.  The full specification was used to architect CPF and has 
been incorporated in our experiments.  This section discusses key aspects of CPF in a detailed 
albeit less comprehensive manner.  We’ve broken down the overview of CPF into three sections – 
defining the CPF record format, publishing the policy, and accessing/interpreting policy. 
 
CPF Record Format 
 
CPF records adhere to a standardized format to ensure that CPF-compliant client applications can 
parse the information properly and consistently.  The record is a single, case-insensitive string of 
text that is processed from left to right with fields delimited by spaces.  The first field in the 
record indicates the protocol version, and is followed by one or more directives.  Consider the 
example below: 
 
v=1 hash_sha1:938ca8e9a284355ce1a7ff7621c1d2d876ab2543 ~all 
\_/ \________________________________________________/ \___/ 
 |     |        | 
Version Directive 1 – hash mechanism Directive 2 – “all” 
  with default qualifier of “+” mechanism with “~”  
   qualifier 
 
Each directive is a single rule comprised of both a mechanism and a qualifier.  Each mechanism 
is an identifier for a certificate, or for a supported DNS resource record that may identify a 
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certificate.  If matched, the client application should enforce the policy much like an access 
control entry (ACE) in a firewall.  Supported mechanism types are as follows: 
 
hash: Defines a hash of a target certificate or public key.  The directive is officially 
denoted as hash_<algorithm>, followed by a “:” and the full hash value.  
Supported hash algorithms include SHA1, SHA256, and SHA512. 
include: Used to refer to another CPF record for policy.  This results in an additional DNS 
query to fetch the target CPF record. 
all: Matches everything, and is used to define the default policy when previous 
directives do not match. 
 
The qualifier is a single symbol at the beginning of the directive that indicates the action to 
execute if the directive is matched.  If no qualifier is specified, then the default qualifier “+” is 
applied. The list of acceptable qualifiers and their associated actions are as follows: 
 
+ Pass: Permit the connection. 
- Fail: Block the connection, and do not offer the user with a means to override 
˜ SoftFail: Warn the user, but allow them to override the error at their discretion 
? Neutral: Permit the connection and log the result.  This qualifier is provided for 
testing purposes, and does not indicate trust.  When the connection is allowed 
based on a “?” qualifier, it is treated with the same level of trust as a service 
that does not have a CPF record published. 
 
One of the most important concepts of CPF is the distinction between the “ - “ and “ ~ “ 
qualifiers.   The “ ~ ” indicates a “SoftFail” condition where the certificate is not trusted, but may 
be permitted by the client application if the user chooses to bypass certificate warnings.  The “ -“ 
instructs the client application to hard-block the connection without allowing the typical user to 
override.  This feature allows organizations to prevent users from bypassing certificate security 
for its services, reducing the risk of unintended data exposure.  We anticipate that the “ - “ will be 
commonly used to protect connectivity with online banking services, trading and brokerage sites, 
healthcare sites, hosting providers, remote access solutions, and other services where a high level 






DNS is used to distribute CPF information since it is a natural fit in many ways.  DNS 
infrastructure is already established and highly scalable, with the proven capacity to handle high 
volumes of queries quickly and efficiently.  The CPF policy text is likely to be very short for 
most situations, thus it can be exchanged easily in a standard DNS UDP packet.  In addition, a 
legitimate server certificate should almost always correlate to a fully qualified hostname such as 
“host.domain.tld”, and thus will be resolvable in DNS.  It is also logical to manage CPF 
information in the same service as the hostname rather than relying upon completely independent 
systems.  The use of an external system would require new infrastructure and dependencies, 
whereas DNS servers are already deployed and maintained with little overhead.  DNS also 
supports the DNSSEC protocol for digital signing of DNS responses, which can prevent MITM 
attacks against DNS queries and responses [1]. 
 
CPF information is published in DNS as TXT records for the purposes of this work.  In the event 
that this protocol is adopted on a wider scale, it will be ideal to use a dedicated resource record 
such as “CPF” to identify certificate policy records rather than the generic “TXT” record.  The 
RFC requires the use of a dedicated “CPF” record type, thus only one CPF record may be 
published for each hostname.  The “include” mechanism may be used to refer to another CPF 
record, which will result in additional DNS queries.  The RFC imposes a maximum limit of ten 
DNS queries when resolving the CPF policy for a hostname; this is in place to prevent abuse by 
blocking CPF records with an excessive number of includes, or recursive includes that may result 
in an infinite loop. 
 
Other special conditions to consider: 
 Wildcard certificates represent any hostname under a domain, not a specific hostname.  
The reserved hostname “_wcc_cpf” is used by CPF when looking up hashes for a 
wildcard certificate.  For example, if a CPF-compatible application is presented with a 
certificate for “*.example.com” but the URL hostname does not match, then the 
application will request the CPF information for “_wcc_cpf.example.com”. 
 Subject Alternative Names are used for services accessed via multiple hostnames.  This 
attribute allows a single certificate to identify both the common name and alias addresses.  
The CPF record for the subject alternative name will likely be the same as the CPF record 
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for the common name, thus the “include” mechanism may be used to link one to the other 
for simplified administration.  
 
Accessing and Interpreting Policy 
 
Most applications support DNS resolution, which means that they can easily access CPF records.  
A CPF-compatible application simply needs to query DNS for the CPF record associated with a 
remote service and then be able to interpret the policy and enforce it.  The application must first 
determine the hostname to query, the source of which may vary depending upon the 
circumstances. 
 
1. Generally the application will connect to a URL like https://www.example.com and the 
hostname will match the certificate common name or a subject alternative name.  In this 
case, the application will query for the hostname specified in the URL. 
 
2. On occasion, the hostname in the URL does not match any of the names assigned to a 
certificate.  This typically occurs if the wrong certificate has been assigned to a service, if 
the service is being accessed by IP address rather than hostname, or if the hostname in the 
URL is an alias that is routed properly via DNS but does not match the certificate 
information.  This condition results in the generation of a certificate hostname mismatch 
error.  Most applications warn the user when this occurs and should continue to do so.  
However, the application should also query for the hostname specified in the certificate 
common name as a precaution.  In the event that a certificate public/private key pair has 
been compromised, the domain owner could potentially advertise that the certificate is no 
longer trusted and to block it using the “-“ qualifier.  This will allow the client application 
to detect the issue and protect the user from the potentially malicious resource. 
 
3. Wildcard certificates are formatted as “*.example.com” where “*” can represent any 
hostname.  As long as the hostname in the URL is represented correctly by the certificate, 
the CPF lookup should be conducted against the URL hostname.  If the certificate does 
not match the URL hostname, then it will be handled as a certificate mismatch error.  In 
this case, the client application will query the CPF record for the hostname “_wcc_cpf” 
rather than “*”. 
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When processing the CPF information, one of seven possible CPF results will be returned: 
 None – no CPF records were published for the target hostname or that the peer address is 
not eligible for CPF lookups.  Ineligible addresses include IP Addresses and unqualified 
hostnames.  The client software cannot ascertain whether or not the peer is authorized 
using CPF. 
 Pass – the domain owner has authorized the certificate to represent the services hosted at 
the given hostname.  The client application can trust that the certificate is deemed 
legitimate from the perspective of the organization operating the service. 
 Neutral – The domain owner has explicitly acknowledged the existence of a certificate 
and its association with a specific hostname, but cannot or does not want to assert 
whether or not the certificate is officially authorized.  This is primarily allocated for 
testing purposes, and should be treated like “None”. 
 SoftFail – Similar to “Fail” but with the distinction that the client application may decide 
how to handle this condition.  It may be configured to log the failure and continue, warn 
the end-user and require approval to continue, etc.  A client application MUST reflect the 
reduced level of trust in a connection when the “SoftFail” result is returned. 
 Fail – an explicit statement that a certificate is not authorized to represent the peer 
hostname.  The client application must abort the connection. 
 TempError – the client application encountered a transient error while performing the 
DNS query.  Checking software can choose to accept or temporarily reject the 
connection. 
 PermError – occurs when the CPF record for the hostname could not be correctly 
interpreted.  This signals an error condition that requires manual intervention to be 
resolved by the domain owner, as opposed to the TempError result.  The client 
application should treat this as either “Fail” or “SoftFail”. 
 
When the client application receives a response to the DNS query, it must parse the results into a 
list of directives much like an access control list (ACL).  Each directive is treated as an access 
control entry (ACE), and they are processed from first to last and executed on a “first hit” basis.  
The application must compare the certificate’s hash value to each entry for matching criteria.  If 
there is a match, then the qualifier’s corresponding CPF result is returned to the client application.  






In order to demonstrate the usage and effectiveness of the CPF protocol, we have provided a 
basic text-based web browser that adheres to the CPF RFC.  The browser was subjected to 
twenty-four tests to calculate compatibility and effectiveness with CPF, and to determine any 
delay incurred due to processing and network performance overhead.  Each of the tests is run in 
two phases – three trials at LAN speed, and three trials in an Internet-simulated environment. 
  
CPF-Compatible Browser Design 
 
The proof-of-concept (POC) web browser is programmed using Java 1.6.x and Perl 5.12.  The 
Java application “CPF-POC.jar” accepts a URL as a command-line argument, connects via 
HTTPS, and fetches the server’s public key certificate.  It then extracts the common name and 
subject alternative names from the certificate and compares them to the hostname specified in the 
HTTPS URL.  Once the application verifies the validity of the certificate, it will pass the 
appropriate hostname to a Perl-based CPF resolver. 
 
The custom Perl resolver “cpf-fetch.pl” leverages Net::DNS to conduct a series of DNS queries 
related to CPF, with additional logic to follow CPF-specific mechanisms like “includes”.  It also 
validates the final CPF information to ensure that errors are properly detected and handled.  
Finally, it prepares the policy in an ACL format, notes any errors, and returns the results back to 
the Java browser for interpretation and enforcement. 
 
The browser’s CPF interpreter parses the output from the Perl script and determines whether the 
CPF ACL needs to be processed.  If no CPF record was present or an error was returned during 
the CPF resolution/validation process, then the CPF interpreter will issue a result immediately.  
Otherwise, the hashes of the peer’s certificate will be compared to each ACL entry.  When a final 
result is determined, the application will act on this information by allowing the connection, 
blocking the connection without the ability to override, or warning the end-user and prompting 








The test environment is composed of three Linux virtual machines – a workstation (vPC1), a web 
server (THS-Web1), and a DNS server (THS-DNS1).  The web server hosts a sample website via 
HTTPS using Apache2, and the DNS server acts as both a recursive and authoritative nameserver 
for our tests using Bind 9.  The hosts are all directly connected over a 1 Gbps link to an Ethernet 
switch.   In the first phase of each test, all three devices are connected via the same network 
switch for a “LAN-based test” as shown in figure 5.  This environment minimizes latency and 
delays, allowing us to observe protocol performance under optimal conditions. 
  
In the second phase of each test, we deployed a WAN emulation virtual appliance on the network 
running WAN-Bridge LiveCD4.  This device acts as a layer-2 Ethernet bridge between the PC 
and servers as shown in figure 6, restricting bandwidth to 3072 Kbps and adding 20 ms of latency 
to each Ethernet frame that traverses it.  This “Internet simulation” allow us to better gauge the 
end-user experience when using CPF over the Internet. 
 
 
Figure 5: Network diagram of environment for LAN-based testing 
 




Figure 6: Network diagram of environment for Internet simulation testing 
 
The DNS protocol does not natively provide authenticity or integrity, two key elements that 
prevent DNS traffic from being transparently manipulated.    Although DNS is the only functional 
requirement for the CPF protocol, some form of digital signing or encryption must be applied in 
order for CPF to provide seamless protection under a MITM attack.  The DNSSEC protocol 
extends DNS to offer these features, although it is not widely implemented to date. 
 
A limited test has been devised to explore the potential performance impact when combining CPF 
with DNSSEC.  The environment is similar to previous experiments, except that a dedicated DNS 
resolver “THS-DNSResolver” has been added (figure 7) to conduct recursive DNS queries and 
validate the DNSSEC responses.  Server THS-DNS1 is running a cryptographically signed 
version of the zone used in experiment #7, as noted in table 2.  In this experiment, the workstation 
vPC1 directs all DNS queries to THS-DNSResolver, which is configured to forward queries for 
covertpacket.com to THS-DNS1.  The “named” service on THS-DNSResolver has been 
configured to use the public key of THS-DNS1 as a DNSSEC trust anchor, allowing it to validate 








Our web browser was subjected to twenty-four unique experiments listed in table 2, to confirm 
that it will behave in accordance with the CPF RFC.  These tests target key features and 
functionality related to the detection and handling of errors, the ability to work with other 
protocols, successful interpretation of policy, and proper enforcement of results.  We found that 
the web browser successfully completed all tests with the anticipated results.  This data indicates 




1 Demonstrate that the “-” qualifier is properly interpreted and enforced per RFC Pass 
2 Demonstrate that the “~” qualifier is properly interpreted and enforced per RFC Pass 
3 Demonstrate that the default “~all” directive is enforced when a CPF record is returned 
but no directives are matched. 
Pass 
4 Demonstrate that the “+” qualifier is properly interpreted and enforced per RFC Pass 
5 Demonstrate that the hostname from the certificate common-name is used for the CPF 
lookup when a certificate hostname mismatch occurs. 
Pass 
6 Demonstrate that default qualifier “+” is applied on directives lacking an explicit qualifier Pass 
7 Demonstrate that the “-“ qualifier will be enforced on the hash mechanism Pass 
8 Demonstrate that the “~“ qualifier will be enforced on the hash mechanism. Pass 
9 Demonstrate that the “?“ qualifier will be enforced on the hash mechanism. Pass 
10 Demonstrate that CPF will default to “~all” (SoftFail) when directives are available but 
none are matched. 
Pass 
11 Demonstrate that the CPF interpreter will detect a malformed hash mechanism Pass 
12 Demonstrate that CPF validates the protocol version Pass 
13 Demonstrate that the CPF interpreter will detect multiple CPF records for a hostname and Pass 
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result in protocol failure.  
14 Demonstrate that the CPF interpreter will detect an invalid mechanism Pass 
15 Demonstrate that SSL connections are permitted when a CPF record is not advertised Pass 
16 Demonstrate that CPF follows “include” mechanisms Pass 
17 Demonstrate that the CPF interpreter limits the number of DNS queries per RFC Pass 
18 Demonstrate that CPF resolver will conduct lookups based on the URL hostname when 
the service is identified by a valid wildcard certificate. 
Pass 
19 Demonstrate that an “include” can be used to link a host’s CPF information to a 
corresponding wildcard certificate 
Pass 
20 Demonstrate that large CPF records ( >512 bytes in size ) will be resolvable via DNS 
using TCP 
Pass 
21 Demonstrate that CPF resolver will conduct lookups based on the URL hostname when 
the service is identified by a certificate subject-alternative-name. 
Pass 
22 Demonstrate that CPF resolver will conduct lookups based on the certificate common 
name when a hostname mismatch occurs between the URL hostname and the certificate 
Pass 
23 Demonstrate that the CPF resolver checks for a corresponding A-record before conducting 
a CPF lookup. 
Pass 
24 Demonstrate that CPF resolver will conduct lookups based on the wildcard certificate’s 
domain when the remote service’s hostname is not valid for a wildcard certificate. 
Pass 





In order for CPF to be a practical solution, it must improve security without significantly 
hindering the end-user’s browsing experience.  Since the protocol builds onto existing browser 
functionality, the minor increase in network and computational overhead will have some impact 
on content delivery.  Our tests measure the time it takes to resolve and process CPF records under 
a variety of common circumstances.  These measurements exclude the time required to load the 
application into memory, as this will vary between applications. 
 
In order to resolve a basic CPF record consisting of a single SHA1 hash and an “all” mechanism, 
approximately 495 bytes of data is exchanged as indicated in tests 7-9.  The time needed to 
acquire, validate, and process CPF information ranges between 6 ms and 8 ms in a LAN 
environment, and 93 ms to 106 ms in the Internet-simulated environment.  These delays and 
bandwidth needs are negligible, and would not be noticed by end-users in either situation.  The 
timings observed in CPF are similar to those experienced when using VeriKey, which range 




Overall bandwidth needs increase when fetching CPF records that are larger in size or employ the 
“include” mechanism.   In addition, numerous DNS queries extend the total duration of time 
needed to fetch and process CPF policy due to the compounding effects of network latency.  For 
example, test 17 follows a recursive CPF “include” ten times before reaching the maximum 
lookup count, resulting in a total of 11 DNS queries.  This resulted in the exchange of 2,733 bytes 
of data, and averaged 505 ms to process in the Internet-simulated environment.  Similarly, test 20 
specifies a CPF record with 13 different SHA1 hashes, which exceeds 512 bytes in length and 
forces DNS to renegotiate transport protocols from UDP to TCP.  In this unusual scenario, 1,330 
bytes are exchanged and processed in an average of 186 ms.  Both of these tests complete in well 
under one second, despite the uncommon data requirements and communications needs 
associated with the CPF policies used in these particular tests. 
 
The performance results of CPF are promising in both the LAN environment and Internet-
simulated environment, and the tests demonstrate that a fast response can be expected in both 
common-sized policies and large policies. This was expected, since a CPF record is generally 
comparable in size to a query for a CNAME or a zone’s MX records, which are routine queries.   
Based on these results, we are confident that CPF can be implemented with little impact to the 
end-user experience. 
 
Performance Impact from DNSSEC 
 
When DNSSEC is applied in the LAN environment, the average DNS resolution time is 12 ms 
compared to 6 ms without DNSSEC.  Similarly, in the Internet-simulation environment, we found 
that the average DNS resolution time is approximately 105 ms as opposed to 97 ms without 
DNSSEC.  Based on these results, the average delay incurred by using DNSSEC is 8 ms – a 
minimal delay.  The DNS payload size for CPF with DNSSEC is substantially larger at 1,211 
bytes, from 495 bytes without DNSSEC.  This increase can be mainly attributed to the inclusion 
of the signed hashes for both the target resource record (TXT or A) and the NS resource record in 
each DNS response.  
 
The true overhead introduced by DNSSEC may vary based upon a number of variables.  The size 
of the DNS data exchange is most dependent upon the length of the DNSSEC zone-signing key 
(ZSK) and the length of the domain name.  The DNS resolver may introduce additional latency 
when fetching DNSSEC-related resource records, validating the chain of trust, and returning the 
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DNS response.  However, it can also leverage caching to improve performance.  It’s also worth 
noting that DNSSEC is required to secure all DNS responses, not just CPF records.  Therefore, 
similar overhead would be experienced when resolving common resource record types, such as 
A-records and MX records.  The overhead of DNSSEC on CPF records would be comparable to 
other records.  While all the conditions related to DNSSEC are difficult to predict, our testing 
generally suggests that DNSSEC does not substantially impact response time.  We do not believe 
that it will significantly affect DNS queries for CPF records in a manner that would be noticeable 




CPF Mechanism Expansion 
 
The current list of mechanisms supported in CPF accommodates most common situations and use 
cases.  It would be worthwhile to explore the expansion of mechanism definitions to include other 
DNS record types.  For example, if the CAA record continues to mature and gain industry 
support, it would be beneficial to use this information to verify certificate authorization based on 
the signing CA.  This will provide a more flexible approach to authorization, with reduced 




Applications, services, and operating systems will need to be updated to support CPF.  This work 
provides the necessary information and a proof-of-concept example to aid in the development 
process.  In addition, the use of DNS as a distribution model simplifies the integration process.  It 
will be beneficial to add CPF support to any application that exchanges public keys or public key 
certificates, such as web browsers, SSH clients, proxy appliances, and SMTP servers.  DNS 
services will also need to be updated to support a new “CPF” resource record type. 
 
Integration with Convergence 
 
CPF and Convergence approach certificate verification in different ways, both of which have 
advantages and disadvantages.  CPF offers an authoritative answer as specified by the service 
owner, which we consider to be a more trustworthy indicator.  Likewise, Convergence allows the 
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user to select notaries for verification, which assures consistency of the public keys provided by a 
service.   One of the advantages of Convergence is that it provides end-users with enhanced 
security for public services regardless of the service owner’s support, whereas CPF requires the 
service owner to maintain a set of records for certificate authorization.  However, CPF offers a 
way to authenticate public keys without direct network access to the service by 
verification/notary servers. 
 
Convergence notaries have the ability to support multiple verification backends, such as 
Perspectives, DNSSEC, and CA PKI [12].  It may be worthwhile to develop a CPF backend for 
Convergence; this would allow Convergence end-users to benefit from CPF when it is available 
for a hostname, but have the ability to fall-back on an alternate backend when CPF records have 
not been published.  As an additional benefit, the CPF lookups would be conducted from an 
independent network, ensuring consistency.  While DNSSEC is recommended with the use of 
CPF, verifying the public key via a CPF backend in Convergence would offer additional security 
for unsigned DNS responses.  Since DNSSEC has not been widely adopted thus far, this would 
be a welcome alternative. 
 
Certificate Assurance Grading 
 
Most applications identify a certificate as being either “trusted” or “untrusted”.  However, in the 
real world people tend to grant trust in varying levels based on their knowledge of an individual 
and his or her actions, appearance, credentials, background, etc.  As new verification methods 
continue to progress and we move away from a system solely managed by CAs, it may be 
beneficial to assign connections a “trust grade” based on the application’s level of assurance that 
the connection is secure and authentic.  This would allow users to judge the level of trust when 
conducting different actions online.  For example, a basic 2048-bit SSL certificate signed by a 
CA may be trusted, but offers a low degree of assurance.  This may be acceptable for a website’s 
contact form or a specialized web application, but users may exercise greater caution when 
exchanging sensitive information.  In comparison, a 2048-bit certificate that’s fully validated by 
the CA, only accepts strong TLS/SSL ciphers, and has a published CPF record offers a high 
degree of assurance that is more appropriate for use with webmail applications, remote access 






Digital trust is an important aspect of network security that millions of people depend upon on a 
regular basis.  PKI plays a vital role in this area, and we believe that the Internet community will 
continue to rely upon this trust model for the foreseeable future.  However, in order for PKI to be 
a reliable solution, the vulnerabilities related to trust confinement must be resolved. 
 
In this work, we present CPF as a unique and effective approach that allows network service 
owners to publish certificate authorization policies using the existing DNS infrastructure.  As a 
result, organizations gain the ability to control authentication for its services, creating a second 
viewpoint external to CAs that counteracts many of the negative repercussions resulting from a 
compromised CA or from fraudulent certificates.  In addition, the CPF protocol allows for greater 
granularity to protect end-users transparently, enhancing the security of certificates and public 
keys on a broad level. 
 
In recent years, researchers have made significant progress identifying weaknesses in PKI and 
certificate-based security, and many have contributed thoughtful ideas and solutions for these 
issues.  The CPF protocol was developed with many of the same issues in focus, and embraces 
the same common goal of improving online trust.  We believe that the previous and ongoing 
efforts discussed earlier in this work offer valuable solutions, and respectfully propose CPF as a 
complementary solution rather than as an alternative.  CPF is able to work collaboratively with 
Convergence/Perspectives, CAA records, TLSA records, and browser certificate inspection as an 
additional layer of security, offering greater overall protection. 
 
We have discussed the goals, design, and implementation of CPF throughout this work, and 
demonstrated that it is capable of enhancing certificate-based security while maintaining an 
acceptable level of performance.  Our work has the potential to benefit a great number of 
organizations and individuals.  We hope that industry leaders will consider it as a solution or as a 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has been widely imp lemented as a 
solution for instilling trust in public key certifi cates.  However, 
one significant risk with PKI is the unconditional trust granted to 
certificate authorities (CAs).  Applications and op erating systems 
consider a CA as untrusted or completely trusted, w ith no further 
granularity.  This means that any certificate issue d by a trusted CA 
will be considered legitimate. 
 
This document defines a protocol for publishing cer tificate controls 
to client applications and services using the domai n name service 
(DNS).  Domain owners may authoritatively offer cer tificate policy 
and authorization information for a given hostname using the CPF 
resource record.  Likewise, client applications may  acquire 
certificate policy by querying DNS for the CPF reco rd of the 
hostname provided, which may then be compared to a certificate’s 
attributes. 
 
The CPF record is an access-control list for certif icates; it may 
identify both specific certificates and certificate s with certain 
attributes, and dictates how each entry should be h andled.  CPF 
policy information will enable applications to dete rmine the 
legitimacy of a certificate authenticating a servic e from the 
perspective of the authoritative organization.  Thi s offers a 
greater level of assurance than that of a third par ty CA, which has 
no direct authority over the service.  In addition,  it allows the 
service owners to dictate how client applications s hould behave when 
presented with an untrusted certificate, further pr otecting 
themselves and their customers, clients, partners, and users. 
 
1.1.  Terminology 
 
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHAL L", "SHALL NOT", 
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and " OPTIONAL" in this 
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119]. 
 
Common Name – X509v3 certificate attribute which de clares the 
primary identity.  In the context of this document,  the common name 
is always a fully qualified domain name (FQDN). 
 
Subject Alternative Name – x509v3 certificate attri bute which 
declares secondary/alias identities related to the common name. 
 




2.  Operation 
 
This section describes how CPF should be published and handled, at a 
high level.  The details of the protocol syntax are  further 
documented in sections 3 and 4. 
 




A CPF-compliant hostname must advertise a CPF recor d, as described 
in section 3.  This record identifies certificates that may 
represent services located at a given hostname, and  indicates how a 
client application should react to a given certific ate. 
 
If domain owners choose to publish CPF records, it is RECOMMENDED 
that they end in “-all” or “~all” so that a definit ive determination 
of authorization can be made.  If a final action is  not defined, the 
default action should be enforced by the client app lication as 
defined in section 4.5. 
 
 
2.2.  Checking Authorization 
 
A CPF-compatible application may perform CPF lookup s for protocols 
protected using certificates, such as SSL-enabled s ervices including 
HTTPS, SMTPS, LDAPS, etc. 
 
2.3.  Interpreting the Result 
 
2.3.1.  None 
 
A result of "None" means that no CPF records were p ublished for the 
target hostname or that the peer address is not eli gible for CPF 
lookups.  Ineligible addresses include IP Addresses  and unqualified 
hostnames.  The checking software cannot ascertain whether or not 
the peer is authorized. 
 
2.3.2.  Pass 
 
A "Pass" result means that the domain owner has aut horized the 
certificate to represent the services hosted at the  given hostname.  
The client application can trust that the certifica te is deemed 
legitimate from the perspective of the organization  operating the 
service. 
 
2.3.3.  Neutral 
 
The domain owner has explicitly acknowledged the ex istence of a 
certificate and its association with a specific hos tname, but cannot 
or does not want to assert whether or not the certi ficate is 
officially authorized.  A "Neutral" result MUST be treated exactly 
like the "None" result; the distinction exists only  for 
informational purposes to facilitate testing. 
 
2.3.4.  SoftFail 
 
A “SoftFail” must be treated as a “Fail”, with the distinction that 
the client application may decide how to handle thi s condition.  It 
may be configured to log the failure and continue, warn the end-user 
and require approval to continue, etc.  A client ap plication MUST 
reflect the reduced level of trust in a connection when the 
“SoftFail” result is returned. 
 
This option has been created to allow a domain owne r to permit a 
bypass mechanism in the event of a failure.  Use of  this option is 
 
 
not recommended, especially for services which are accessed over 
public or untrusted networks. 
 
2.3.5.  Fail 
 
A "Fail" result is an explicit statement that a cer tificate is not 
authorized to represent the peer hostname.  The cli ent application 
must abort the connection.  This action prevents th e software or 
end-user from bypassing the failure and exchanging data over an 
untrusted and potentially compromised connection. 
 
If the domain owner does not wish to hard-block use rs from a 
hostname on certificate authorization failure, then  he may configure 
the CPF record to result in a “SoftFail” instead. 
 
2.3.6.  TempError 
 
A "TempError" result means that the client applicat ion encountered a 
transient error while performing the DNS query.  Ch ecking software 
can choose to accept or temporarily reject the conn ection.   
 
2.3.7.  PermError 
 
A "PermError" result means that the CPF record for the hostname 
could not be correctly interpreted.  This signals a n error condition 
that requires manual intervention to be resolved by  the domain 
owner, as opposed to the TempError result.  The cli ent application 




3.  CPF Records 
 
A CPF record is a DNS resource record (RR) used to publish 
certificates that are, or are not, allowed to repre sent services 
located at a specific hostname. 
 
A CPF record is a single, case-insensitive string o f text, processed 
from left to right.  Please consider the following example: 
 
v=1 hash_sha1:6a0e9a60583c365eedafad7f4010965515dc0 14a –
hash_sha1:42ac0d3e30198c893a1f301939ace903019355ec ~all 
 
This record has a CPF protocol version of “1” and t hree directives: 
1.  Allow certificate with SHA-1 hash of 
6a0e9a60583c365eedafad7f4010965515dc014 
2.  Fail on certificate with a SHA-1 hash of 
42ac0d3e30198c893a1f301939ace903019355ec. 




3.1.  Publishing 
 
CPF-compliant services must have CPF records publis hed for 




The example above in Section 3 might be published v ia these lines in 
a domain zone file: 
 




mail.example.com.  IN CPF “v=1 
hash_sha1:938ca8e9a284355ce1a7ff7621c1d2d876ab2543 –all” 
 
CPF records are comprised of text-based content, an d can be lengthy 
depending on the hash algorithms used and number of  certificate 
hashes contained in a given record.  Large records may cause 
problems with size limits; this is documented furth er in section 
3.1.5. 
 
3.1.1.  DNS Resource Record Types 
 
This document defines a new DNS RR of type CPF, (CO DE TBD). The 
format of this type is identical to the TXT RR [RFC 1035]. The 
character content of the record is encoded as [US-A SCII]. 
 
The TXT RR is a common method for distributing text -based 
information via DNS.  However, since the TXT resour ce record is used 
generically for multiple purposes, its use may lead  to unnecessary 
bandwidth usage and processing.  The CPF RR has bee n designated in 
order to avoid this caveat.  The TXT RR must not be  used to 
distribute CPF record information. 
 
3.1.2.  Scope 
 
A CPF record MUST be applied to a specific DNS host name, with the 
exception of wildcard certificates (discussed in 3. 1.6).  A 
networked service is traditionally identified by ho stname, and as 
such CPF records should be matched one-to-one with this.   
Certificates traditionally authenticate a service b y hostname as 
either the “Common Name” or “Subject Alternative Na me” attribute. 
 
3.1.3.  Multiple DNS Records 
 
A hostname MUST NOT have multiple CPF records publi shed.  In the 
event that more than one record is returned, the re sult “PermError” 
should be issued. 
 
3.1.4.  Multiple Strings in a single DNS Record 
 
As defined in [RFC1035] sections 3.3.14 and 3.3, a single text DNS 
record can be composed of more than one string. If a published 
record contains multiple strings, then the record M UST be treated as 
if those strings are concatenated together without adding spaces. 
For example: 
 
 IN CPF "v=1 .... first" "second string..." 
 
MUST be treated as equivalent to 
 




CPF records containing multiple strings are useful in constructing 
records that would exceed the 255-byte maximum leng th of a string 
within a single CPF RR record. 
 
3.1.5.  Record Size 
 
The published CPF record for a given hostname SHOUL D remain small 
enough that the results of a query for it will fit within 512 
octets. This will keep even older DNS implementatio ns from falling 
over to TCP. Since the answer size is dependent on many things 
outside the scope of this document, it is only poss ible to give this 
guideline: If the combined length of the hostname a nd the text of a 
CPF record is under 450 characters, then DNS answer s should fit in 
UDP packets. Records that are too long to fit in a single UDP packet 
should fail to TCP.  In the event that the entire r ecord cannot be 
retrieved, the PermError result should be returned.  
 
3.1.6.  Wildcard Certificates 
 
Wildcard certificates are commonly used to represen t any hostname 
under a given domain, where the common name attribu te resembles 
“*.example.com”.  From a security perspective it’s not ideal to use 
wildcard certificates, but there are practical use cases for them. 
 
A CPF resource record for wildcard certificates MUS T be applied 
using a special, reserved hostname “_wcc_cpf” (for “wildcard 
certificate CPF).  In order to enable CPF for a ser vice using a 
wildcard certificate, the service’s hostname should  advertise a CPF 
record similar to “include:_wcc_cpf.example.com”. 
 
3.1.7.  Subject Alternative Names 
 
Subject Alternative Names are used for services whi ch are accessed 
via multiple hostnames.  This attribute allows a si ngle certificate 
to identify both the common name and alias addresse s. 
 
The CPF lookup SHOULD be initiated for the hostname  requested by the 
application in order to support multitasking lookup s.  The CPF 
record for the Subject Alternative Name will likely  be the same as 
the CPF record for the common name.  The domain adm inistrator may 
use the “include” mechanism to link one to the othe r, allowing for 
simpler management. 
 
3.1.8.  CPF Record Caching and TTL 
 
CPF records are subject to caching, just like any o ther DNS resource 
record.  Since CPF information reflects certificate  authorization 
and access controls, it’s ideal to refresh this inf ormation on a 
more regular basis.  It is recommended to set the t ime-to-live (TTL) 
for these records between 20 minutes and 4 hours. 
 
 
4.  Client Lookups 
 




In order to query the CPF record via DNS, the clien t application 
SHOULD be provided with a fully-qualified hostname,  such as 
mail.example.com .  IP addresses are not DNS-resolvable and thus are  
not supported by CPF.  It is NOT RECOMMENDED to con duct CPF lookups 
on unqualified names where a domain name is not pro vided.  
Certificate name attributes should always be fully- qualified for 
security reasons, and CPF embraces this practice. 
 
4.2.  Initial Processing 
 
If the hostname is malformed per [RFC1034] name spa ce specifications 
or is not fully qualified, or if the DNS lookup ret urns "domain does 
not exist" (RCODE 3), the client application must r eflect the result 
as “none”. 
 
Mechanisms like “include” will require DNS lookups to fetch 
additional CPF information.  A maximum of ten (10) DNS queries may 
be executed as part of a CPF lookup, including the initial CPF 
query.  If this limit is exceeded, then the applica tion should abort 
the lookup and return a “PermFail” result. 
 
4.3.  Record Validation 
 
After one CPF record has been returned, the client application must 
validate the syntax, and if successful will process  the directives.  
If there is a syntax error in the CPF record, then the application 
will treat the result as “PermError” and discontinu e processing. 
 
CPF entries are space-delimited, and read from left  to right.  The 
first entry MUST be v=#, where “#” is the CPF proto col version.  
Each following entry is a directive comprised of a mechanism, and 
optionally a qualifier preceding it.  The last entr y should consist 
of the “all” mechanism, with the desired qualifier.   Please see the 
example below. 
 
 v=1 hash_sha1:938ca8e9a284355ce1a7ff7621c1d2d876ab 2543 ~all 
 \_/ \_____________________________________________ ___/ \___/ 
  |     |       | 
 Version Directive 1 – hash mechanism Directive 2 –  “all” 
  with default qualifier of “+” mechanism with “~”  
   qualifier 
 
        
Mechanisms and qualifiers are documented in greater  detail in 
section 4.4 
 
4.4.  Record Processing 
 
The CPF record is interpreted one entry at a time, on a “first hit” 
basis much like an access control list.  If the ent ire record is 
processed without any explicit matches, then the de fault result will 
be applied as documented in section 4.5. 
 
Each mechanism is an identifier for a certificate, or another DNS 
resource record identifying a certificate.  Qualifi ers specify the 
action to take on a specific mechanism.  The combin ation of the 
 
 
mechanism and qualifier is a directive, which CPF-c ompatible clients 
are able to enforce. 
 







The qualifier is optional and defaults to "+" if un specified. 
 







 ~hash_sha1:6a0e9a60583c365eedafad7f4010965515dc014 a 
 
4.5.  Default Result 
 
If none of the directives match and there is no “al l” directive, then 
the application SHOULD implicitly enforce this as “ ~all”. 
 
 
4.6.  Lookup Methodology 
 
This section offers guidelines for an application t o conduct 
lookups, to ensure the most practical and secure im plementation.  
 
4.6.1.  Order-of-Operations 
 
An application should conduct CPF lookups using a h ostname provided 
from one of two sources: 
-  Destination string (sub-component of URL) 
-  Certificate “common name” attribute 
 
The following order of operations is RECOMMENDED: 
 
//Part 1 – lookup by destination string (preferred)  
IF the destination string is a hostname 
 THEN initiate CPF lookup on destination string. 
END IF 
 
//Part 2 – lookup by certificate common-name (fallb ack approach) 
IF the destination string is an ip-address OR the c ertificate name 
attributes do not match the destination string (hos tname mismatch) 
 THEN initiate CPF lookup on certificate common nam e 
END IF 
 
This approach is optimal because the destination st ring should 
always match a certificate name attribute for a leg itimate service.   
This also allows multi-threaded applications to con duct the CPF 





In the case that a hostname mismatch occurs, the ce rtificate SHOULD 
be looked up independently.  Some applications, suc h as web 
browsers, display a warning when a name mismatch oc curs.  However, 
by conducting this additional CPF lookup, we may le arn that the 
domain owner for the certificate common name has bl ocked the 
signature for the provided certificate.  This may h appen if the 
public/private key pair has been compromised.  In t he event that the 
CPF lookup on the “common name” attribute returns a  soft-fail or 
fail result, this SHOULD be enforced by the applica tion.  Other 
results (pass, neutral, etc.) may be ignored and th e default 
application settings for certificate mismatches sho uld be enforced. 
 
4.6.2.  Pre-fetching Data 
 
A remote service that is CPF-compatible MUST be ver ified prior to 
the exchange of application data in order to minimi ze the risk of 
data exposure. 
 
Some applications may wish to download content befo re the identity 
of the remote service has been verified via CPF, an d then process 
the cached data if approved.  This behavior is ofte n implemented in 
order to accelerate content delivery and improve th e user’s 
experience.  However, certain information may be ex posed to an 
untrusted party unintentionally.  For example, an H TTP GET request 
is used to download content, but may include a quer y string with 
sensitive variables such as a session ID. 
  
 
5.  Mechanism Definitions 
 
5.1.  “all” 
  
The “all” mechanism is a default that will match an ything, and is 
the last mechanism evaluated in the record.  This a cts as a default 





 v=1 hash_sha1:6a0e9a60583c365eedafad7f4010965515dc 014a -all 
 
This entry will allow a certificate matching the sh a-1 signature 
specified, and deny all other certificates. 
 
5.2.  “include” 
 
The "include" mechanism allows a CPF record to link  to the CPF 
record of a different hostname.  This is useful whe n services 
accessed at a specific hostname are being represent ed by wildcard 
certificates, or if the hostname is a subject alter native name for 
the service. 
 
All directives of an included CPF record are proces sed except the 
“all” mechanism (if present).  Matches must be hono red, regardless 




For example, www.example.com  is identified by a wildcard 
certificate: 
 
www IN CPF “v=1 include:example.com –all“ 
IN CPF “v=1 hash_sha1: 
6a0e9a60583c365eedafad7f4010965515dc014a –all 
 
This will direct the client to query the CPF record  for example.com 
as well, and apply it to the hostname www. 
 
 
5.3.  “hash” (hash_ <algorithm>)  
 
The “hash” mechanism provides the hash value of a p ublic key 
certificate.  The mechanism suffix specifies the ha sh value selected 
by the domain owner.  A fixed number of hash algori thms will be 
supported by CPF, to ensure greater compatibility a nd security.  The 
following hash mechanisms are currently supported: 
 
hash_sha1: SHA1 hash of certificate 
hash_sha256: SHA256 hash of certificate (RECOMMENDE D) 
hash_sha512: SHA512 hash of certificate 
 
The hash value should be generated from the PEM for mat of a 
certificate, with all new-line characters removed ( carriage return, 
line feed, etc).  This will ensure that the hash va lue is generated 
properly regardless of operating system or applicat ion. 
 
 
5.4.  Future expansion 
 
There are several DNS resource record types emergin g for identifying 
certificates; one example is the CERT record define d by RFC draft-
hallambaker-certhash-00, or the CAA record defined by RFC draft-
hallambaker-donotissue-03. If adopted by the global  IT community, 
these could be used as mechanisms in the CPF protoc ol. 
 
 
6.  Considerations 
 
6.1.  DNS Security 
 
CPF records are exchanged via DNS, which is an unen crypted protocol 
by default.  This makes it susceptible to a network -based man-in-the 
middle (MITM) attack, where the DNS packet can be a ltered to 
neutralize CPF. The use of DNSSEC is recommended to  assure the 
integrity and authenticity of DNS traffic, includin g CPF traffic. 
 
6.2.  Local Attacks 
 
CPF can mitigate network-based (MITM) attacks in mo st circumstances.  
However, its benefits are limited against local att acks.  If malware 
infects a machine, it can potentially manipulate an  application or 
operating system.  Potential attacks include, but a re not limited 
to, the following: 
 
 
-  Compromise an application and alter its behavior to  see every 
CPF lookup as a non-failing result like “none” or “ pass”.  A 
man-in-the-browser (MITB) attack would be one examp le of this. 
-  Compromise an operating system and act as a shim to  intercept 
API calls for DNS queries, and always return a non- failing 
result. 
 
6.3.  Compromised DNS Services 
 
If a DNS server were compromised, the attacker may gain the ability 
to alter DNS records including CPF.  By itself, thi s type of 
incident does not significantly impact the potentia l to misrepresent 
a service since a certificate still needs to be iss ued by a valid 
CA.  However, it could be used to launch a denial-o f-service attack 
by changing the CPF record to “-all”.  
 
6.4.  Compromised Certificate Management Services 
 
A number of certificate authorities provide web-bas ed portals for 
certificate management, protected by username/passw ord 
authentication.  These portals typically allow user s to create, 
revoke, or re-issue certificates. 
 
If a certificate management account were compromise d, the attacker 
could gain the ability to order new certificates or  revoke/re-issue 
an existing certificate.  Depending on the validati on checks 
conducted by the CA, a valid certificate may be iss ued to the 
correct account, but under the control of an illegi timate 
individual.  This would enable the attacker to depl oy services and 
identify themselves with legitimacy, endangering an y client system 
initiating the connection. 
 
CPF-compliant hostnames will have less exposure tha n hostnames 
lacking a CPF record.  So long as the client applic ation supports 
CPF lookups, it will compare the re-issued certific ate to the CPF 
record and detect that it is not authorized by the domain owner. 
 
6.5.  Transparent SSL Interception 
 
A growing number of organizations are implementing network security 
solutions including data-loss prevention, intrusion  
detection/prevention, web filtering, antivirus scan ning, etc.  In 
some cases these countermeasures are configured to transparently 
intercept encrypted traffic in order to scan for le gitimate 
purposes.  This is accomplished via man-in-the-midd le interception 
using an internal PKI with a custom certificate aut hority that each 
client device is configured to trust.  When using C PF, client 
applications will see all certificates signed by a proxy appliance, 
which will not be in the CPF record for the associa ted domain.  
While it’s generally good for CPF to act against un authorized 
certificates, this situation presents challenges. 
 
When client applications implement CPF, it may be b eneficial to 
include a local setting which allows specific CAs t o override CPF.  
Also, the software/appliances transparently proxyin g connections 





Alternatively, organizations may be able to reconfi gure the 
transparent device to act as an explicit proxy.  Th is resolves the 
issue by forcing the client application to establis h connections 
directly with the proxy device. 
 
 
6.6.  Self-Signed Certificate Authorization 
 
Certificate authorities are an essential component of PKI, and 
provide the valuable function of validating a certi ficate 
requestor’s legitimacy.  CPF is intended to provide  an additional 
layer of protection, and must not be viewed as a re placement for 
CAs.  If a certificate is not signed by a trusted i ssuer, then CPF 
must not be evaluated.  Rather, the application sho uld enforce a 
specific policy for these conditions on a global an d/or case-by-case 
basis. 
 
If CPF were allowed to override CA trust, it would introduce a 
dangerous condition where a malicious individual co uld manipulate 
both network connections and trusts via DNS (either  by compromise or 
MITM). Consider the situation where an organization ’s DNS server is 
compromised – the attacker could redirect network t raffic to a 
controlled device with a self-signed certificate.  In addition, the 
attacker could add a CPF record for the self-signed  cert, allowing 
it to appear as trusted by the client application.  By allowing this 
functionality, it would provide an easy mechanism f or attackers to 
fake PKI security. 
 
6.7.  Complimenting CRL/OCSP 
 
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are used to pub lish certificates 
which have been revoked by the certificate authorit y and are no 
longer considered trusted.  Online Certificate Stat us Protocol 
(OCSP) is a newer method for delivering similar inf ormation on a 
certificate-by-certificate basis, offering better p erformance and 
faster distribution than CRLs.  
 
CPF offers the ability to block certificates matchi ng specific 
signatures using the “fail” qualifier.  This functi onality has been 
included as a secondary method for domain owners to  block 
illegitimate or compromised certificates.  This mec hanism is 
intended to compliment CRLs/OCSP, not to replace th em.  Certificates 
MUST still be revoked through a certificate authori ty, and 
applications MUST continue to fetch CRLs and OCSP i nformation. 
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